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1. Introduction    
Multi-attribute (Multi-issue) negotiation protocols have been studied widely, and represent 
an important challenge in the multiagent systems community (Lai et al., 2004). Therefore, a 
lot of automated negotiation models and protocols have been developed, and manifold 
negotiation challenges have been already addressed. Most research in automated 
negotiation to date has focused on the competitive aspect (Vo et al., 2007). On the other 
hand, work by Dispute Resolution theorists in the social sciences has also focussed 
substantially on how to achieve negotiated agreements that are of a high value to all parties 
(Fischer & Ury, 1981). This approach is known as Integrative or Interest-based negotiation, and 
it has been recognised as the more successful approach to the negotiation problem. Example 
scenarios where such cases may arise are: business process management involving agents 
within the same organization, e-commerce negotiations where the seller is interested in 
having a satisfied buyer (e.g. long-term commercial relationships), or e-commerce scenarios 
where risk averse agents avoid the conflict in the negotiation processes. In the context of 
purchase negotiation scenarios, it is clear that every negotiation partner tries to maximize 
his preferences. However, when an agent aims at optimizing his own benefit with no regard 
for the others’, it has been shown that negotiators more often than not reach inefficient 
compromises. Conflict theorists Lax and Sebenius (Lax & Sebenius, 1992) argue that 
negotiation necessarily includes both cooperative and competitive elements, and that these 
elements exist in tension. Therefore, he refers to the problem of deciding whether to pursue 
a cooperative or a competitive strategy at a particular time during a negotiation as the 
Negotiator's Dilemma. However, it is not always possible to separate the integrative 
bargaining process, i.e. when agents use cooperative strategies to search for joint gains, from 
the distributive bargaining process, i.e. when agents use competitive strategies in order to 
'claim value'. The main problem is that distributive and integrative processes interplay with 
each other making information manipulation becomes part of the integrative bargaining 
process.Integrative negotiation contrasts with distributive bargaining in which the parties 
are trying to distribute a fixed resource, and where if an agent wins another agent looses. 
Distributive negotiation predicts that one party can only gain at the other party’s expense. 
The key characteristics that distinguish integrative negotiations from distributive ones are: 
creation of value; focus on interests and not positions; openness and exchange of relevant O
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information, and even learning; and problem restructuring. In order to achieve integrative 
approaches, literature of automated negotiation proposes a number of techniques such as 
multi-attribute utility theory, distributed constraint satisfaction, and cojoint analysis. A common 
aspect in all these techniques and in integrative negotiation approaches in general is that a 
multi-attribute negotiation scenario is required. Attributes are the characteristics of the 
negotiation item that are taken into account during the evaluation. The idea is that it may be 
beneficial for people to introduce multiple issues in a negotiation when they have different 
preferences over these issues because it may be possible to trade off one issue for another in 
order to reach agreements where both the negotiators are better off. So, in multi-attribute 
negotiations the parties involved need to settle more than one issue. For example, agents 
may need to come to agreements that are characterized by attributes such as price, quality, 
delivery time, and so on. If the impact of the issues under negotiation over the satisfaction 
function is different for each agent (that is, some issues are more important for a participant 
than for the others and vice versa), the issues may be traded-off against one another, 
increasing the social welfare of the deal.  
Both in single and multi-issue negotiations the outcome depends on four key factors (Fatima 
et al., 2006): the negotiation protocol, the participant’s strategies, the players’ preferences over the 
possible outcomes, and the information that the participants have about the others. However, in 
multi-issue negotiations appears an additional factor: the negotiation procedure, which 
specifies how the issues will be settled. There are three ways of negotiating multiple issues: 
Package deal which links all the issues and discusses them together as bundle, Simultaneous 
negotiation which settles the issues simultaneously, but independently, and Sequential 
negotiation which negotiates the issues sequentially one after another. This chapter will focus 
on a package deal based procedure. 
As we pointed out before, many automated negotiation models have been developed. They 
may be classified regarding many different criteria (Buttner, 2006). Regarding their 
theoretical approach, game theoretic, heuristic and argumentation-based approaches exist. The 
game-theoretic approach tries to find optimal strategies by the analysis of the equilibrium 
conditions (Nash, 1950). Game-theoretic models are deemed mathematically elegant, but are 
very restricted in use because of their assumptions of unlimited resources, perfect rationality 
and a perfect information situation. In heuristic approaches the mentioned assumptions are 
relaxed, and players try to find an approximate solution strategy according to principles of 
bounded rationality by utilizing heuristic search and evaluation techniques (Faratin et al., 
1998; Ehtamo et al., 1999; Faratin et al., 2002; Klein et al., 2003; Gatti & Amigoni, 2005; Lai et 
al., 2006; Ito et al., 2008;). Both in game-theoretic and heuristic approaches, negotiation 
protocols are usually based on the communication of offers in the form of potential 
agreements. In contrast, in argumentation-based negotiations, the agents are able to reason 
their positions including a meta-level component that may use promises, rewards, threats, 
as well as issue various forms of appeal (Rahwan et al., 2003). In addition to the theoretical 
approach criterion, negotiation can be classified regarding its structure, regarding the 
negotiation process, and regarding the restrictions over time and information situations.  
In addition to the problem of selecting the optimal strategies in the negotiation processes, 
the agent's decision making mechanisms in multi-attribute negotiations have to face the 
problem of characterize the preference on all attributes. The characterization of preferences 
has a critical influence on the negotiation protocols and decision-making mechanisms. To 
end up with this introduction we briefly review some of the most relevant approaches in 
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negotiation to model preferences, and pick up one of them to propose a multi-attribute 
negotiation protocol that will be presented in the following sections. 
A typical way to model preferences is to use utility functions. In the case of multiple 
attributes, we talk about multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT). Another approach to model 
preferences is to employ multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) (also called multi-objective or 
multi-criteria optimization) theory. In MCDM an agent has several objectives that are 
statements that delineate the desires of a decision maker. Thus, an agent wishes to maximise 
his objectives, which in some cases will conflict which each other in that the improved 
achievement with one objective can only be accomplished at the expense of another. Given 
an assignment of values to the corresponding attributes an agent measures how much the 
different objectives are fulfilled. Finally, a utility function is applied over the set of different 
levels of satisfaction of the agent's objectives. Research on those topics is conducted mostly 
in the field of decision theory. In the negotiation models described in the literature which 
use the utility based approaches to the modelling of preferences, the negotiation protocols 
are based on the communication of offers and counteroffers expressed as an assignment of 
values to the corresponding attributes. This approach to negotiation is known as positional 
bargaining, and is the predominant form of negotiation in the game-theoretic and heuristic 
approaches to negotiation. On the other hand, in argumentation-based negotiation the 
exchange of offers and counteroffers includes meta-information with the aim of reason the 
agents' positions. In the area of interest-based negotiation, another way to modelling 
preferences is to use constraints to restrict the attribute values that are preferred. Constraints 
in different formats, from fuzzy to probabilistic or weighted constraints, have been used in 
several models and approaches to multi-attribute negotiation (Luo et al., 2003; Lai & Lin, 
2003; Ito et al., 2008). There are three main reasons that make very convenient the use of 
constraints as the core of a negotiation model. First, it is an efficient way of capturing 
requirements; second, constraints are capable of representing trade-offs between the 
different possible values for attributes; and third, using constraints to express offers in turns 
means that the solution space can be explored in a given exchange and so means that the 
search for an agreement is more efficient than in positional bargaining. The negotiation 
framework presented in this chapter falls within the heuristic approaches to non-mediated 
multi-attribute bilateral negotiations under incomplete information settings, and uses fuzzy 
constraints to model agent’s preferences. With incomplete information we mean that agents 
lack information about other's discounting factors, reservation prices, utility functions or 
deadlines, and with non-mediated we mean that agents negotiate without the intervention 
of a mediating agent. The negotiation model is based on the hypothesis that by means of an 
expressive approach to constraint based negotiation the negotiation processes may be more 
efficient than with other approaches where mainly positional bargaining is used. Behind this 
is the idea that with the cost of a bounded increase in the revelation of private information, 
the decision mechanisms are more accurate when searching the negotiation space.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next Section recalls the most 
relevant concepts on modelling agent’s preferences and presents some preliminaries. Section 
3 presents an example negotiation scenario where two different negotiation techniques are 
applied in order to show the possible advantages of expressive negotiation. Then the 
negotiation framework followed by an empirical evaluation is described. Finally, Section 6 
presents the conclusions. 
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2. Modelling agent’s preferences 
A multi-attribute negotiation can be seen as a distributed multi-objective optimization problem. 
The participants in a negotiation have their own preferences over the negotiated attributes, 
and these preferences can be formulated in its most extensive form as a multi-objective or 
multi-criteria decision making problem. By definition, objectives are statements that 
delineate the desires of a decision maker. Thus, an agent wishes to maximise his objectives. 
However, it is quite likely that a decision maker’s objectives will conflict with each other in 
that the improved achievement with one objective can only be accomplished at the expense 
of another. Therefore, a negotiator agent has to settle at a compromise solution. This is the 
topic of the multi-criteria decision making theory. Part of the solution to this problem is that the 
agent has to identify or approximate the Pareto frontier in the consequence space (i.e. in the 
space of the satisfaction levels of the different objectives). This task can be accomplished 
using different methods based on standard optimization techniques. Regarding the 
negotiation process it can be seen as a special case of multi-objective optimization problem. 
In this case, we have a set of distributed agent’s objectives that should be satisfied. Each 
agent’s objective depends on his individual objectives. The question now is if we can 
compute the Pareto frontier in a similar way. Assuming a set of agents which formalize their 
preferences as a multi-objective decision making problem, and that each agent computes his 
Pareto frontier, the only way to solve this problem in a similar way would be to share this 
information to formulate the global multi-objective optimization problem. In practice, this 
could be done by means of a trusted mediator, but it has a fundamental problem, agents and 
humans try to minimise the revelation of private information in negotiation to avoid 
strategic manipulation. Moreover, though Pareto optimality is a key concept in multi-
objective optimization, we cannot forget that the aim of the negotiation is to reach an 
agreement, and so, it is necessary to pick up a fair solution from the Pareto frontier. 
However, fairness is not an easy concept to manage in negotiations. 
2.1 Multi-attribute decision problems 
As we stated before, negotiator agents are decision makers, and their decisions are based on 
preferences over the values of the different attributes. Formally, a Multi-Attribute Decision 
Problem (MADP) is defined as a set of attributes X = {x
1
,..., x
n
} ; a set of domain values 
 
D = {D
1
,..., D
n
}  where each D
i
is a set of possible values for attribute x
i
; a set of constraints 
 
C = {C
1
,...,C
m
} where each C
j
 is a constraint function on a subset of attributes to restrict the 
values they can take; a set of available outcomes O = {o
1
,...,o
l
} where each o
j
is an element of 
the possible outcome space D, and O is a subset of D; and a set of decision maker’s 
preference statements P = {P
1
,...,P
m
} . Agents negotiate over the same set of attributes and 
domain values, but each agent has a different set of constraints, available outcomes and 
preference statements. In a negotiation process, agents try to maximize their preferences, 
and in order to compute those values they have to solve the MADP. Among the different 
approaches to model agents’ preferences from the MADPs perspective we survey two 
different categories of methods: the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) framework, and the 
multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT). For a detailed survey including more methods on 
MADPs see (Zhang & Pu, 2005). 
A CSP is defined by a 3-tuple <X,D,C>, where X is a set of variables, D is a set of domains 
and C is a set of constraints. A solution to a CSP is a set of value assignment 
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v = {x
1
= v
1
,...,x
n
= v
n
} where all constraints in C are satisfied. Therefore, the constraints are 
crisp (hard) since they are either respected or violated. A number of different approaches 
have been developed for solving this problem. One simple approach is to simply generate-
and-test. However, when the CSP is complex the algorithm is not practical due to the 
computational complexity. A more efficient method is the backtracking algorithm that 
essentially performs a depth-first search of the space of potential CSP solutions. However, 
the complexity of backtracking for most nontrivial problems is still exponential. Other 
search algorithms for classical CSPs include: forward checking, partial lookahead, full lookahead, 
and really full lookahead. 
We can see how a solution of a classical CSP needs to satisfy all the crisp constraints. 
Comparing the definition of classical CSP and MADP we can see that the main difference 
between them is that the MADP has a set of preferences, some of which can be violated 
when finding the optimal solution. Classical CSPs have been extended to soft CSPs in which 
not all the given constraints need to be satisfied. In the following, we recall several kinds of 
soft CSPs and a general framework which describes both classical and soft CSPs. 
Fuzzy CSPs (FCSPs) extend the hard constraints by fuzzy constraints. A fuzzy constraint is a 
mapping from the direct product of the finite domain of the variables referred by the 
constraint to the [0,1] interval. The solution of a fuzzy CSP is the set of n-tuples of values 
that have the maximal value. The value associated with each n-tuple is obtained by 
minimizing the values of all its sub-tuples. An FCSP can be solved in a similar way as 
classical-CSP turning all fuzzy constraints into hard constraints. 
Probabilistic CSPs (PCSPs) model those situations where each constraint c has a certain 
independent probability p(c) to be part of the given real problem. Let v be an n-tuple value 
set, considering all the constraints that the n-tuple violates, we can see that the probability of 
n-tuple being a solution is (1− p(c))
all c that v violates
∏ . The aim of solving PCSPs is to get the n-
tuple with the maximal probability. The main difference between FCSPs lies in the fact that 
PCSPs contain crisp constraints with probability levels, while FCSPs contain non-crisp 
constraints. Moreover, the criteria for choosing the optimal solutions are different. 
Weighted CSPs (WCSPs) allow to model optimization problems where the goal is to 
minimize the total cost of a solution. There is cost function for each constraint, and the total 
cost is defined by summing up the costs of each constraint. Usually WCSPs can be solved by 
the Branch and Bound algorithm. 
A semiring-based CSP framework describes both classical and soft CSPs. In this framework, 
a semiring is a tuple (A,+,x,0,1) such that: A is a set and 0,1∈A; + is a close, commutative, 
and associative operation on A and 0 is its unit element; x is a closed, associative, 
multiplicative operation on A; and 1 is its unit element and 0 is its absorbing element. 
Moreover, x distributes over +. A c-semiring is a semiring such that + is idempotent, x is 
commutative, and 1 is the absorbing element of +. 
Both the classical CSPs and the different type of soft CSPs can be seen as instances of the 
semiring CSP framework. The classical CSPs are Semiring-CSPs over the semiring 
 
S
CSP
= ({ false,true},∨,∧, false,true)  which means that there are just two preferences (false or 
true), that the preference of a solution is the logic and of the preferences of their subtuples in 
the constraints, and that true is better than false. FCSPs can be represented by 
 
S
FCSP
= ([0,1],max,min,0,1)  which means that the preferences are over [0,1], and that we 
want to maximize the minimum preference over all the constraints. Similarly, the semiring 
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corresponding to a PCSP is S
PCSP
= ([0,1],max,×,0,1) , and the WCSPs can be represented by 
the semiring 
 
S
WCSP
= (R+ ,min,+,+∞,0) . 
Utility theory and MAUT has been used in solving decision problems in economics 
especially for those involving uncertainty and risk. Given the utility function, the decision 
maker’s preferences will be totally determined, and the optimal solution will be the outcome 
with the maximal utility. When using MAUT to solve a multi-attribute decision problem 
that only involves certainty, the main task is to assess the value function according to the 
decision maker’s preferences.  
Let 
 
O = {O
1
,...,O
n
} be a set of outcomes of the MADP, A be the set of all lotteries on the set O 
where 
 
p
i
o∑ i ∈A , pi ∈[0,1] , and pi = 1∑ ; and ; be a binary relation on A . First we define 
4 axioms: 1)  ; is complete, i.e. either x ; y or y ; x; 2) ; is transitive, i.e. if x ; y and y ; z, 
then x ; z; 3) Continuity: given x ; y ; z, then there is an α ,β ∈(0,1) such that 
 αx + (1−α )z ; y and y ; βx + (1− β)z ; 4) Independence: for all x, y , z∈A and any  α ∈[0,1] , 
x ; y if and only if αx + (1−α )z ;αy + (1−α )z . Then the von Neumann Morgenstern Theorem 
proved the existence of utility function theoretically provided that the relation  ; satisfies 
the four axioms: Let A be a convex subset of a linear space, and let ; be a binary relation on 
 A , then  ; satisfies the four axioms if and only if there is a real-valued function  u : A→ℜ  
such that:  
a.  ∀x, y ∈A,x ; y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y) ; 
b. 
 
∀x, y ∈A and ∀α ∈(0,1),u(αx + (1−α )y) =αu(x)+ (1−α )u(y) . 
The function u is called the utility function. 
Keeney and Raiffa (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976) extended the utility theory to the case of multi-
attributes. Multi-attribute utility theory is concerned with the valuation of the consequences 
or outcomes of a decision maker’s actions. For a decision problem where each action has a 
deterministic outcome, the decision maker needs only to express preferences among 
outcomes. The preference relation can be captured by an order-preserving, real-valued 
value function. Then, the optimal problem of the multi-attribute decision problem can be 
converted into the format of the standard optimization problem to maximize u(x). When 
there is uncertainty involved in the decision problem, the outcomes are characterized by 
probabilities. It must be noted that a utility function is a value function, but a value function 
is not necessarily a utility function. In the case that only certainty is involved, the utility and 
value function are interchangeable. 
3. A non-mediated bilateral negotiation model based on fuzzy constraints 
Here we propose a non-mediated fuzzy constraint based negotiation framework for 
competitive e-marketplaces in which multiple buyer agents negotiate bilaterally with 
multiple seller agents to acquire products. In competitive markets, there is an inherent need 
to restrict the amount of private information the agent reveals. However, this restriction can 
have a detrimental effect on the search for a solution. As we stated above, especially in the 
case of multi-attribute negotiations, it is possible to reach a more satisfactory agreement by 
means of an adequate combination of attributes or constraints. However, most solutions put 
forward to tackle this problem are mediated, iterative and approach mechanisms, which are 
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applicable to preference models based on linear-additive or quasi-concave utility functions 
(Ehtamo et al., 1999; Faratin et al., 2002; Lai et al., 2006). Other approaches based on non-
linear utility spaces include a mediator in the negotiation processes (Klein et al., 2003; Gatti 
& Amigoni, 2005; Ito et al., 2008). As an alternative to these solutions, we propose one based 
on the concept of communicative rationality rather than one which is merely strategic and 
retains as the fundamental criteria the minimization of private information revealed. Our 
solution is therefore based on a dialogue of offers in which preferences or satisfaction 
degrees are partially disclosed. The hypotheses on which the work is based is that of an 
interactive model which is sufficiently expressive to allow a discussion of proposals by 
means of a partial declaration of preferences which permits the agents to reach a more 
satisfactory agreement, being confined to the need to minimize the loss of privacy. The 
negotiation framework is defined by: a fuzzy constraint based model of preferences; the 
expressive behaviors and strategies of the agents; an interaction model that permits the 
automatic generation of expressive or non-expressive dialogues with different degrees of 
symmetry; and finally a set of decision mechanisms adapted to the interaction model and 
the preferences of the agents. 
There are several works using fuzzy constraints to model preferences, however, most of 
them use single point offers (i.e. positional bargaining). The FeNAs (Fuzzy e-Negotiation 
Agent system) platform (Kowalczyk & Bui, 2000) uses fuzzy constraints and permits 
correlated multiple bilateral negotiations. It is one of the first works in which the problem of 
multi-attribute negotiation is clearly presented using a preference model based on FCSP. 
The main problem with FeNAs resides in its being a positional approach. Lai (Lai & Lin, 
2004) presents a general framework for multi-attribute and multilateral negotiation based on 
fuzzy constraints. The negotiation model is based on FCSP, which when applied to a 
distributed domain of agents is organized as a network of distributed fuzzy constraints 
(DFCN). This work makes some very important contributions to the regularization of the 
mechanisms for calculating the satisfaction degree and to the available concession and 
compensation strategies. It introduces fuzzy logic techniques to the relaxation decision 
making area that allow concession strategies to be defined that are a function of the beliefs 
and desires of the agents. The model is also based on single-point offers and there is no 
argumentation, but decision-making is based on the behavior of the opponent and the type 
of offers received. In accordance with the mentioned above procedures, if there is no 
convergence in the first relaxation steps, the number of offers increases exponentially. If 
there are a large number of attributes, the number of possible proposals for a particular cut 
level becomes intractable. Although the similarity function can help with convergence, a 
certain amount of knowledge of the utility functions of the opponent is assumed. Finally, 
Luo (Luo et al., 2003) develops a fuzzy constraint based model for bilateral multi-issue 
negotiations in semi-competitive environments. It uses crisp constraints to express offers 
and includes the idea of rewards and restrictions. The most noticeable aspects are related to 
the acceptability function and with the operators used to apply the prioritization of the 
fuzzy constraints. Assuming the seller agents’ dominant strategy is to offer the first product 
that satisfies the constraints, the model isn't efficient enough because it exhibits a large lack 
of symmetry. In this model a buyer agent has a great communication power (expressing 
offers by means of constraints) while the seller agent can only offer specific products or 
request a relaxation of the constraints. In this way, the opportunity to apply some form of 
solution compensation technique so that a win-win solution is obtained is lost. 
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3.1 Expressive vs inexpressive negotiation dialogues 
In this subsection a bilateral negotiation scenario is presented, comparing two approaches, 
one expressive and the other non-expressive, in which all the advantages that our approach 
contributes to the problem will be discussed.  
A buyer agent and a seller agent begin a negotiation dialogue about the sale of a vehicle. 
The buyer agent expresses a desire to buy in the following way: “I want to acquire a car at a 
low price, of high quality and as new as possible”. From this statement, it can be taken there are 
three issues that are of interest to the buyer agent, the price, the quality and the age of the car. 
The requirements of the buyer agent are therefore defined by these three fuzzy constraints, 
so that a priori, no specific range is defined for each issue to determine whether a constraint 
has been satisfied. In the seller agent's case we could propose a formulation of preferences 
or sale needs in a similar way, however, in trading scenarios the seller agent may be more 
inclined towards the use of catalogues of products. In Figures 1 and 2, the buyer agent's 
preferences and a summary of the seller agent's catalogue are shown respectively. The labels 
above each step represent the range of the attributes value domain, in such a way that the 
states can appear as intervals, numeric groups or as linguistic terms. The higher steps 
represent greater satisfaction degrees. If we analyse the diagram we can see that, for 
 
 
Fig. 1. Buyer agent’s preferences 
 
Fig. 2. Seller’s catalogue of products 
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example, the fuzzy constraint expressed as low price is divided in intervals in accordance 
with the different satisfaction degrees of the buyer agent.The catalogue of products is 
defined by a series of rows each one of which characterizes a product. For each product, the 
satisfied range of values of the buyer agent’s attributes is shown. The last column represents 
the utility the seller agent obtains if the product is sold. This utility value does not have to 
have any direct correlation with the negotiable attributes, there may exist other private 
issues (non negotiated) that have a greater influence on the utility value. 
To give an example of our working hypothesis we first present a possible negotiation 
dialogue between a buyer and seller agent (see Figure 3) that we will call non-expressive. In 
this type of dialogue the argumentation capability with respect to the offers is minimal. The 
buyer agent makes offers in the form of crisp constraints taken strategically from the fuzzy 
constraints that represent its overall requirements. On the other hand, the seller agent is 
only able to accept or reject an offer. So, we see in the example that the buyer agent 
successively relaxes its demands, as after each offer the seller agent responds with a refusal 
(as it does not have products that satisfy the constraints). Finally, in the last stage, the seller 
agent finds a product p4 that satisfies the buyer agent's requirements. However, this 
solution provides a very low profit for the seller agent. It is clear that the negotiating 
position of the buyer agent is much stronger, their requirements are described in detail in 
each offer, and at no time does the seller agent give any clue as to its preferences. The 
limitations of the language used mean that the only possible criteria that can be used to find 
solutions are local preferences. The question we must ask ourselves is whether there exists a 
solution that would have been more satisfying for the seller agent without worsening the 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of non-expressive dialogue 
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buyer agent satisfaction degree, and the answer rests in the solution p3, which would 
indeed have been more satisfactory for the seller agent without being less so for the buyer 
agent.As an alternative, we now present a new dialogue, which we term expressive, in 
which the concepts that form the basis of our hypothesis are applied.In Figure 4, the 
buyer agent and the seller agent negotiate the purchase of an automobile under the same 
preference conditions used in the previous dialogue. In this dialogue two important 
innovations appear: Firstly, the buyer agent is able to subjectively value its offers; and 
secondly, the seller agent is able to clarify its refusal to offer a product, by using expressions 
that allow it to state which constraints it wants the buyer agent to relax. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Example of expressive dialogue 
We will now analyse the course of the dialogue.  
1. The first offer made by the buyer agent is the one that subjectively offers it the greatest 
satisfaction. Apart from the offer, defined as a set of crisp constraints, these constraints 
contain meta-information that grades them depending on the degree of importance 
each of them has. Thus, the constraint Very Low is considered as very important and it 
is expressed like this in the dialogue. The seller agent does not have a product that 
satisfies all the constraints, so it has no choice but to refuse the offer. However, it argues 
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its refusal with an attack based on preferences, suggesting that the buyer agent relax 
constraints with differing degrees of preference. From the seller agent point of view, 
any of the constraints in the initial dialogue can be relaxed. 
2. The buyer agent's second offer involves relaxing the quality constraint. As the seller 
agent had no preference for which constraint should be relaxed, the buyer agent relaxes 
at random one of the constraints (quality or age) that least affects its satisfaction degree. 
The quality constraint now becomes the buyer agent's choice, because to do so later 
would involve a greater loss of satisfaction than the relaxation of any other constraint. 
When the seller agent receives the offer, it is unable to find a product that satisfies all 
the constraints. However, it concludes that products p2 and p3 come close to the buyer 
agent's requirements. To be precise, the seller agent reasons in the following way: p2 
will provide me with more profit, but on the other hand, although p3 will provide me 
with slightly less profit, it is closer to the buyer agent's requirements. After the seller 
agent has made the previous reasoning, it tries to persuade the seller agent by first 
asking it to relax the price and age constraints. 
3. The third stage of the negotiation follows similar parameters to the previous one.  
4. In the buyer agent's fourth offer, the price constraint is the most important. The seller 
agent analyses its catalogue and rejects p1 because of its low utility and estimated 
distance. With regards to p2, it decides that it satisfies the age and quality constraints, 
and that p3 satisfies the price and quality constraints, and finally, that p4 satisfies the 
price and age constraints. A priori, the three products are relatively close to the buyer 
agent requirements, but the description of the price constraint as very important affects 
the estimation of the closeness or distance of p2. The distance of products p3 and p4 is 
estimated to be similar, so the buyer agent discriminates depending on the utility of the 
solutions. The conclusion is that the seller agent decides that p3 is the best possible 
offer. He then puts all its effort into ensuring the sale of p3, although it does not satisfy 
the age constraint, which is why the request to relax concentrates on this constraint.  
5. After receiving the request to relax, the buyer agent finds that a priori, it has no 
problem with relaxing either the quality or the age constraint. Under the assumption of 
negotiation based on interests or principles, the buyer agent accepts the request to relax 
the age constraint. The seller agent has a product, p3 that satisfies the present 
requirements. The overall satisfaction of the solution is greater than in the case with 
non-expressive negotiation.  
The challenge of developing all the concepts in the example involves several aspects. Firstly, 
an agents’ preference model formalization. Secondly, a definition of the negotiation profile 
for modelling the agent's behaviour towards their opponents. Creation of a communication 
model that, amongst other things, details the locutions needed to be able to deal with all the 
expressive nuances. Development of decision making mechanisms. Finally, a working 
language specification allowing the decision mechanisms to be linked to the expressions 
available to the agents. 
4. Negotiation framework 
The negotiation framework consists of a description of the agent's domain knowledge; a 
dialogue model; the decision mechanisms; and the transition rules that connect the locutions to 
the mechanisms. 
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4.1 Agent’s domain knowledge 
Buyer agent's requirements over the attributes of a product are described by means of a 
fuzzy constraint satisfaction problem (FCSP), which is a 3-tuple (X ,D,C f )  where 
 
X = {x
i
|= 1,...,n}  is a finite set of variables, D = {d
i
|= 1,...,n} is the set of finite domains of the 
variables, and 
 
C f = {R
j
f | j = 1,...,m} is a set of fuzzy constraints over the variables. It is 
worth noting that a fuzzy constraint may restrict more that one variable or attribute. A 
fuzzy constraint corresponds to the membership function of a fuzzy set. The function that 
numerically indicates how well a given constraint is satisfied is the satisfaction degree 
function
 
μ
R j
f : X → [0,1] , where 1 indicates completely satisfied and 0 indicates not satisfied 
at all. Given the cut level σ ∈[0,1] , the induced crisp constraint of a fuzzy constraint  R f is 
defined as R
c . It simply means that if Rc is satisfied, the satisfaction degree for the 
corresponding fuzzy constraint will be at leastσ . Therefore, the overall (global) satisfaction 
degree (osd) of a given solution x' = (x
1
' ,...,x
n
' ) is: 
 α(x ') = min{μ
Rf
(x ')|R f ∈C f }  (1) 
On the other hand, a seller agent owns a private catalogue of products S = {s
k
|s
k
= (p
k
,u
k
)} , 
where 
 
p
k
is the vector of attributes and u
k
is the profit the seller agent obtains if the product 
is sold. We assume that the profit u
k
may depend not only on the negotiated attributes but 
also on non-negotiated ones (stock period for instance). 
Let 
 
A
b
and 
 
A
s
represent a buyer and a seller agent, a negotiation process is a finite sequence 
of alternate proposals from one agent to the other. During the negotiation stage, 
 
A
b
utters 
purchase requirements,  
 { }c( )| [1, ]jjR j mσπ = ∈∩  (2) 
where
 
R
j
c(σ
j
)
is a crisp constraint induced from R
j
f at a cut level σ . Therefore, a purchase 
requirement is a purchase proposal that is formed by a set of crisp constraints extracted 
from the set of fuzzy constraints that describes the buyer's preferences regarding the 
attributes of the products. Each crisp constraint in the purchase requirement can be induced 
at a different cut level. Complementing the osd definition, the potential or expected overall 
satisfaction degree (posd) is the osd that a buyer agent may get if the corresponding purchase 
requirement is satisfied. It is defined as:  
 α π = min{σ
i
|i = 1,...,m}  (3) 
A seller agent may respond to a buyer agent in three different ways: rejecting the proposal, 
offering a product that satisfies the purchase requirement, or suggesting the relaxation of the 
purchase requirement. A relaxation requirement is defined as a set:  
 ρ = {r
j
|r
j
∈[0,1]}  (4) 
where
 
ρ
j
is the preference for constraint j to be relaxed. The negotiation process and the 
agreements achieved will mainly vary depending on the strategies followed by the agents 
when generating purchase requirements and when requesting its relaxation. We cover all 
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these aspects modeling the agents' attitudes. Agents' attitudes are related to the agents' 
strategic behavior in the negotiation process, where strategic behaviors are described in 
terms or expressiveness and receptiveness. A negotiation profile Profile
seller
= {ψ ,β} describes 
the seller agent's attitude, where ψ ∈{0,1} controls whether it uses or not relaxation requests 
in order to express its preferences for a specific relaxation of the previous buyer's demands, 
and  β ∈[0,1] modulates its attitude regarding a purchase requirement received from a buyer 
agent. Finally, a negotiation profile Profile
buyer
= {ξ ,η} describes the buyer agent's attitude, 
where 
 
ξ ∈{0,1} controls whether it uses or not purchase requirement valuations defined as: 
 v = {v
j
|v
j
∈[0,1]}  (5) 
where 
 
v
j
 is the degree of importance that the constraint j has for the buyer agent, and 
 η ∈[0,1] modulates its attitude regarding a relaxation requirement received from a seller 
agent. 
4.2 Negotiation dialogue 
The framework of formal dialogue games is increasingly used as a base for structuring the 
interactions of agents communication protocols (McBurney et al., 2003), adopted from the 
theory of argumentation field. Formal dialogue games are those in which two or more 
players pronounce or transmit locutions in accordance with certain predetermined rules. In 
our negotiation model all dialogues are confined to two agents, one the buyer and the other 
the seller, so that the dialogues are exclusively bilateral. A dialogue is structured in 
accordance with the following stages: 
1. Opening the dialogue. 
2. Negotiation: this stage is defined by a sequence of iterations that are based on the 
domain knowledge mentioned earlier. These iterations are now itemised:  
• Buyer agent:  
- Transmit purchase requirements. 
- Transmit valuation of purchase requirements. 
- Reject sale offers. 
• Seller agent: 
- Transmit sale offers. 
- Rejects purchase requirements. 
- Propose the relaxation of purchase requirements. 
- Reject purchase obligations. 
3. Confirmation: the participants come to a compromise and reach an agreement. 
4. Close of dialogue: the dialogue ends. 
Our dialogue proposal is subject to the following rules: 
a. The first stage in the dialogue is Opening of the dialogue. 
b. The Opening and Closing stages of the dialogue can only occur once in the whole 
dialogue. 
c. The only stages that must appear in all dialogues that end normally are Opening and 
Closing of the dialogue.  
d. The Confirmation stage requires the negotiation stage to have occurred previously. 
e. The last stage of all dialogues that end normally is Close of dialogue. 
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The participants can commute between the negotiation and confirmation stages, subject only 
to the rules and the constraints defined by the combination of locutions rules, which we 
describe later. 
Our purchase negotiation dialogue is defined as sequence of four stages: open dialogue (L1-
2), negotiate (L3-8), confirm (L9-10) and close dialogue (L11).  
L1: open_dialogue b s( , , )P P θ bP suggests the opening of a purchase dialogue to a seller 
participant sP  on product categoryθ . sP wishing to participate must respond with 
enter_dialogue(.). 
L2: enter_dialogue s b( , , )P P θ  sP indicates a willingness to join a purchase dialogue with 
participant bP . Within the dialogue, a participant bP must have uttered the locution 
open_dialogue(.). 
L3: willing_to_sell s b( , , )jP P p sP  indicates to the buyer bP a willingness to sell a product. A 
buyer bP  must have uttered a desire_to_buy(.) or a prefer_to_buy(.) locution.  
L4: desire_to_buy (P
b
,P
s
,πB
req
) bP , speaking to the seller sP , requests to purchase a product 
that satisfies the purchase requirementπB
req
. 
L5: prefer_to_sell (P
s
,P
b
,πBreq ,ρBreq ) sP , speaking to the buyer, requests to relax the purchase 
requirement
 
πB
req
, and expresses which constraints are preferred to be relaxed, by means of 
the relax requirement ρBreq . 
L6: prefer_to_buy (P
b
, P
s
,πBreqk ,υBreq ) bP , speaking to the seller, requests to purchase a product 
which satisfies the purchase requirement πB
req
k , and expresses its preferences for the different 
constraints by means of the purchase requirement valuationυBreq . 
L7: refuse_to_buy b s( , , )jP P p Buyer agent expresses a refusal to purchase a product. This 
locution cannot be uttered following a valid utterance of agree_to_buy(.). 
L8: refuse_to_sell (P
s
,P
b
,p
j
|πBreq ) Seller agent expresses a refusal to sell a product, or it 
expresses a refusal to sell products that satisfy the purchase requirement πB
req
. This locution 
cannot be uttered following a valid utterance of agree_to_sell(.). 
L9: agree_to_buy b s( , , )jP P p  Buyer agent bP speaking to sP commits to buy a product. A 
locution of the form willing_to_sell(.) must have been uttered. 
L10: agree_to_sell s b( , , )jP P p  Seller agent speaking to buyer agent commits to sell a product. 
A locution of the form agree_to_buy(.) must have been uttered. 
L11: withdraw_dialogue x y( , , )P P θ  For xP and yP participants with different roles (i.e. sellers 
and buyers). xP  announces agent yP the withdrawal from the dialogue. 
Next step is to specify the mechanisms that will invoke particular locutions in the course of 
a dialogue. 
4.3 Decision mechanisms 
Syntactic rules are not enough to ensure that the dialogues are generated automatically. It is 
essential to equip each participant with mechanisms that allow it to invoke the correct 
locution at the right time, as a response to previous locutions or in anticipation of future 
ones. This type of mechanism we term semantic decision mechanism. The mechanisms are 
grouped together depending on the role of the participant: Buyer (B) or Seller (S). We will 
now describe each mechanism's general directive and then detail their specific features. In 
addition, we specify the output generated by the mechanisms, a key point for describing, in 
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the following Section, the working features or working semantics that connect the decision 
mechanisms and the locutions. We begin with the buyer agent's decision mechanisms. 
B1: Recognize Need Allows a buyer agent to recognize the need to acquire a product. This 
recognition may be as a consequence of the explicit initiative of the user (e.g. through an 
interface the user gives an order to their personal agent of their intention to acquire a 
product), or it could be an automatic response based on thresholds that are triggered 
automatically (e.g. when a personal agent detects that it is within range of an electronic 
market that offers a particular type of product that falls within the preferences of the owner 
of the personal agent). When it detects the need and furthermore interprets that it is possible 
to begin a dialogue the mechanism's output is have_need ( )θ . Outputs: wait, have_need ( )θ , 
have_no_need ( )θ , where ( )θ  defines a product category. 
B2: Generate Purchase Requirement This mechanism responds to a buyer agent's need to 
generate purchase requirements. Any purchase requirement must be compatible with the 
locution desire_to_buy(.) or prefer_to_buy(.). Two possible outputs are recognized, one that 
states that it is impossible to generate a requirement and another that specifies the 
requirement generated. Outputs: empty_set∅ , 
req
πB  
The method for extracting crisp constraints directly affects the way a purchase requirement 
is accepted, and indirectly affects the potential overall satisfaction degree the buyer agent 
hopes to obtain. There are two possible strategies when extracting crisp constraints to satisfy 
a purchase requirement and generate a specific potential overall satisfaction degree: 
(Concession strategy) Given a purchase requirement 
req
tπB sent at an instant t ∈` , a general 
concession strategy is defined as mechanism that generates a new purchase 
requirement 1
req
tπ +B so that 
1t t
req req
π πα α+ <B B and 1t treq reqπ πα α ε+ ≥ −B B , where (0,1]ε ∈ . 
According to this definition, ε is an arbitrary value that fixes the maximum loss of potential 
overall satisfaction that the buyer agent is willing to accept when generating a new purchase 
requirement. It determines the agent’s behaviour with respect to how rapidly it is willing to 
make concessions over its purchase requirements.  
(Compensation strategy) Given a purchase requirement
req
tπB sent in an instant t ∈` , a 
compensation strategy is a mechanism that generates a new purchase requirement 1
req
tπ +B so 
that
1t t
req req
π πα α+ ≥B B . 
We now move on to the specific mechanisms that put these strategies into practice. There 
are two ways to generate a new purchase requirement:  
Adding a new fuzzy constraint. This way of generating purchase requirements is intended for 
two specific situations: the start of the negotiation, when the first purchase requirement 
should be prepared, and during the negotiation, after a sale offer that does not satisfy the 
constraints not included in the purchase requirement. In the first case, the agent selects a 
fuzzy constraint and applies the highest cut level to extract the corresponding crisp 
constraint and create the purchase requirement
req
tπB . By using this method, the agent is 
following the minimum revelation of information principle and the requirement obtained 
generates the greatest potential overall satisfaction degree. In the second case, a new 
constraint is selected from amongst those not satisfied by the sale offer received. 
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Modification of a previous purchase requirement. This way of creating a purchase requirement is 
intended for a specific situation: the locutions prefer_to_sell(.) or refuse_to_sell(.) sent by the 
seller agent during the negotiation with the intention of expressing its refusal to satisfy the 
buyer agent's requirements. Given a purchase requirement
req
tπB , and after receiving one of 
these locutions as a reply, the cut levels associated with the fuzzy constraints included must 
be changed and this change affects the potential overall satisfaction degree. Therefore, the 
generation of a new requirement 1
req
tπ +B will be the aim of the application of one of the 
concession or compensation strategies and the problem is reduced to determining the plan 
for relaxing the previous purchase requirement
req
tπB . We propose the meta-strategy, which 
consists, when possible, of applying the compensation method and in its absence the 
concession method. The following algorithm implements the required function. 
Algorithm 1. (Modification of purchase requirements) 
1. Given a purchase requirement
req
tπB , a vector is obtained with the potential overall 
satisfaction degrees for all the possible purchase requirements resulting from the 
relaxation each time of only one of the constraints contained in
req
tπB : 
( 1)( 1)
1
[ ... ]
tt kk i
req req
π πα α
++
B B
 
where
( 1 )t kx
req
πα
+
B
represents the potential overall satisfaction degree obtained if the 
constraint 
x
f
kR is relaxed the minimum possible. The constraints that cannot be relaxed 
must be eliminated from the vector. If none of the constraints can be relaxed the 
function returns∅ . 
2. The maximum of the previous vector is calculated: 
( 1 )( 1 )
1
1 ([ ... ])
tt kk i
req reqt
max max
π πα α α
++
+ = B B  
3. A new vector 1tmaxα +
JJJJG
is generated in which only the elements that satisfy the following 
equality are included: 
 
( 1 )
1
t kx
reqt
max
πα α
+
+ = B   
4. Finally, the following function is applied: 
 
( 1)
1 ,
arg max *
t kx
req
t t x
max max
kr
π
α ρ α η
+
+ +JJJJJJG B  
where tmaxρ is a relax requirement from the seller agent, in which only those constraints 
included in the vector created in stage 3 are taken into account. If there are no relax 
requirements, 
xk
r always takes the value 0. This function selects the constraint or constraints 
that maximize the total potential overall satisfaction that is induced if they are relaxed and 
of the relax requirement correspondingly weighted by the value η of the buyer agents 
receptive profile.  
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5. Once the constraint or constraints with the option of being relaxed are selected, one is 
chosen and a new purchase requirement is created 1
req
tπ +B , in which only the chosen 
constraint is modified. 
The first three stages of the algorithm focus on the search for those constraints in 
req
tπB which 
if relaxed involve the smallest possible loss of potential overall satisfaction. Once these 
constraints have been detected, stage 4) takes into account only these constraints and, if 
there is a relax requirement, what the seller agent's preferences are in this respect. At one 
extreme if 0η = , the only criteria for relaxing is local, whereas if 1η = , the maximum 
importance possible is being given to the seller agent's recommendations. It is important to 
clarify that as we have defined in stage 2) the maximum value for filtering the potential 
satisfaction values, the function defined in 4) would only vary if 
xk
r varies, being 
( 1 )t kx
req
πα
+
B
a 
constant the same as 1tmaxα + . However, we have decided to show the function in a more 
general form so we can easily extend the criteria of the maximum to other criteria. 
B3: Generate Purchase Requirement Valuation This mechanism allows a valuation 
argument to be generated for a purchase requirement that has not yet been sent, i.e. a 
purchase requirement valuation
req
υB . This can be communicated by the locution 
prefer_to_buy(.). The impossibility of obtaining a valuation generates the output an empty_set. 
Taking into account that the argumentation of a requirement is a reflection of the expressive 
character of the buyer agent, the mechanism will be controlled by its expressive profileξ . If 
this has the value 1 the mechanism activates and tries to generate the valuation, if it has the 
value 0, the mechanism does not activate a valuation and returns an empty_set. When there 
are no valuations the buyer agent uses the locution desire_to_buy(.), whereas if there are 
valuations it uses the locution prefer_to_buy(.). Outputs: empty_set∅ , 
req
υB  
A valuation of a purchase requirement is an expression of how important for the buyer 
agent the satisfaction of each of the purchase requirements constraints is. We propose the 
following algorithm. 
Algorithm 2. (Valuation of a purchase requirement)  
1. Given a purchase requirement, by sending 1
req
tπ +B , a vector is obtained with the potential 
overall satisfaction degrees for all the possible purchase requirements that result from 
relaxing only one of the constraints in 1
req
tπ +B each time. The potential overall satisfaction 
degrees of those constraints that cannot be relaxed have the value 0: 
 
( 2 )( 2 )
1
[ ... ]
tt kk i
req req
π πα α
++
B B
 
2. The elements of the previous vector are taken and a new standardized vector is defined 
that represents the valuation of the purchase requirement:  
 
( 2 ) ( 2 )( 2 ) ( 2 )
1 1
[1 ...1 ]/ ([1 ...1 ])
t tt tk kk ki i
req req req req
req
sum
π π π πυ α α α α
+ ++ +
= − − − −B B B BB  
The mechanism defines the valuation strategy of the purchase requirement as a strategy 
based on potential satisfaction degrees. To clarify which potential satisfaction degrees we 
are talking about we will describe a normal valuation process. When mechanism B2: 
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Generate Purchase Requirement is executed, a purchase requirement called 1
req
tπ +B is generated 
from a requirement sent earlier, termed
req
tπB . To generate 1reqtπ +B the fictitious potential 
satisfaction degrees 
req
tπB have been used. However, in carrying out the valuation, the 
fictitious potential satisfaction degrees of the proposal 1
req
tπ +B , which has not yet been sent, are 
being generated. To sum up, what is being estimated is the potential satisfaction degree that 
could be obtained if the buyer agent requests another new requirement.  
As we also take into account in the definition of the mechanism, the valuation of a constraint 
is contrary to the potential satisfaction degree that is obtained if it is relaxed. For this reason, 
we have chosen to carry out the operation 
( 2 )
1
t kx
req
πα
+
− B on each constraint. Finally, it is 
necessary to make clear that in the case of constraints that cannot be relaxed, by assigning a 
value of 0 to the potential overall satisfaction degrees in stage 1) a maximum valuation is 
obtained.  
B4: Consider Offers This mechanism responds to the buyer agents need to decide at any 
given moment whether to: accept or reject a sale offer proposed by the seller agent, or generate 
a new purchase requirement. Sending a purchase requirement
req
tπB , a buyer agent accepts a sale 
offer jp when the overall satisfaction degree ( )jpα is greater than or equal to the potential 
overall satisfaction degree of the purchase requirement 1
req
tπ +B . In this case the mechanism 
returns accept_offer( p
j
). The acceptance of an offer opens the offer confirmation stage of the 
dialogue. If a sale offer cannot be accepted and the offer does not satisfy the constraints sent 
in
req
tπB , the mechanism returns reject_offer( p j ) indicating that a rejection expression must be 
generated. Finally, if the sale offer cannot be accepted, but satisfies the constraints sent 
in
req
tπB , the mechanism returns generate_purchase_requirement( p j ), indicating that a new 
purchase requirement must be generated. 
Outputs: accept_offer( pj ), reject_offer( pj ), generate_purchase_requirement( pj ) 
When a sale offer cannot be accepted, in one case the mechanism indicates that a new 
purchase requirement must be generated whilst in the other it indicates that a rejection 
expression must be generated. In both cases, the non-acceptance of the offer has its origin in 
the desired overall satisfaction degree not being reached. However, when the offer does not 
satisfy the constraints that have been sent we should interpret it as an anomaly. The seller 
agent may for example be sending offers indiscriminately. If however, a sale offer is not 
accepted, but satisfies the constraints that have been sent, this means that the sale offer does 
not adequately satisfy fuzzy constraints that have not been sent. In this case, we cannot 
assume that there is any anomaly in the seller agent's behaviour.  
B5: Consider Withdrawal This mechanism responds to the buyer agent's need to decide at 
any given moment if it should terminate a dialogue with the seller agent. The mechanism 
can remain in wait mode and so returns wait or indicate whether the dialogue should be 
terminated in which case it returns withdraw (θ ). Outputs: wait, withdraw (θ ). 
We now present the seller agent's decision mechanisms. 
S1: Recognize Category Allows a seller agent to recognize the need to sell a product. The 
mechanism merely assures that the seller agent has available products of the category (θ ) in 
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its catalogue. If the products are available the mechanism returns wish_to_enter (θ ), and if 
not wish_not_to_enter (θ ). The mechanism can remain in wait mode, and so returns wait. 
Outputs: wait, wish_to_enter (θ ), wish_not_to_enter (θ ) 
S2: Assess Purchase_Requirement This mechanism responds to the seller agent's need to 
valuate purchase requirements. The main objective of a valuation is to detect the existence of 
products in the catalogue that satisfy the purchase requirements. If the products are not 
found, the mechanism decides whether to argue the rejection of the requirement received or 
not. This decision is function of the agent's expressive profile ψ , so that if it has value 1, the 
decision is to argue, and if it has value 0 not to argue. When there is a sale offer the 
mechanism returns sale_offer( p
j
), if it decides to argue the purchase requirement it returns 
purchase_requirement ( )
req
tπB , and if it decides not to argue it returns an empty_set. Outputs: 
empty_set∅ , purchase_requirement ( )
req
tπB , sale_offer( p j ) 
Next, we propose an algorithm for implementing the mechanism. 
Algorithm 3. (Selection of sale offers) 
1. The products of maximum utility are selected. 
2. Of the products selected in 1) those that have been sent the least number of times are 
chosen. 
3. Of the products selected in 2) one is chosen at random. The function returns this product. 
4. The seller agent's working memory is updated, increasing the number of times the 
product chosen in 3) is sent. 
Choosing the product with the greatest utility is consistent with the agent's rationality with 
respect to utility maximization. Selecting the product that has been offered the least number 
of times is a consequence of logical reasoning, by estimating that if a product has not been 
accepted previously, it is unlikely to be accepted now, so better to try with a product with 
the same utility, but which has not been offered yet.  
S3: Generate Potential Sale-Offers This mechanism for generating potential sale offers 
responds to the seller agent's need to use introspection to analyse which products in its 
catalogue would be considered as good offers at any given moment. We denominate these 
offers potential sale offers because their purpose is to serve as a reference in the rejection 
argumentation process of a purchase requirement. This mechanism returns a set of products 
from the catalogue S that it considers would be a good choice for a future offer to the buyer 
agent. Outputs: Sp, that details the set of products the seller agent considers would be a good 
choice for a future offer. 
This mechanism constitutes the nucleus of the seller agent argumentation system. When a 
seller agent cannot satisfy a purchase requirement, it can motivate the buyer agent to change 
its preferences and consequently its proposals or purchase requirements. In a non-
argumentative approach, the seller agent's only tool is rejection, but a mechanism based 
solely on rejection does not allow the negotiation to be taken to a more favourable position 
for the seller agent and even less arrive at a win-to-win solution. One way of promoting 
convergence in the negotiation from the seller agent's point of view is to express how a 
received purchase requirement should be relaxed. This expression is finally specified by the 
relax requirement
req
ρB . We understand a relax requirement as a two stage mechanism: the 
generation of potential sale offers (which are implemented in the mechanism we are 
describing), and the generation of the relax requirement 
req
ρB (which is implemented in the 
mechanism S4 described below). 
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The relax requirement is an expression of the seller agents preferences for the relaxation of 
specific constraints. The problem therefore is to discover which criteria the seller agent 
should apply to lean towards one constraint or another. We should recall that the final 
objective of the seller agent is to sell a product, and in particular decide which products it 
prefers to sell. The selection of preferred products is developed during the generation of 
potential sale offers stage. Once the products it prefers to sell have been selected, the relax 
requirement will try to lead the buyer agent towards those products, which is basically the 
same as trying to get it to relax those constraints that are not satisfied by the products that 
have been chosen as sale offers. However, choosing the candidate products is by no means 
an easy task. If we focus the search on strictly local criteria, we can lose the idea of what the 
buyer agent really wants, and on the other hand, if we concentrate solely on the needs of the 
buyer agent, the utility obtained by the sale can be diminished. Anyway, it seems obvious 
that there are two abstract ideas that should govern the selection of candidates, local and 
external criteria. We have identified two fundamental aspects in particular for carrying out 
the selection process:  
Utility 
Dependents on the uj parameter defined for each product in the catalogue, would be a 
strictly local criterion focused on the utility of the sale.  
Viability 
Dependents on the degree of similarity between each product jp and the purchase 
requirement
req
πB , and the valuation the buyer agent is expected to make of the product on 
potential offer. This would be an external criteria connected to the buyer agents needs. 
These two aspects are expressed by the function prefer( s
j
)that assigns a preference value for 
each of the products in the catalogue. To modulate the importance and viability it turns to 
the agent's receptive profile β . So, we propose the following definition for the function 
prefer:  
 n( ) * (1 ) * ( , , )
req req
t
j j jprefer s u viability pβ β π υ= + − B B  (6)  
At one extreme, if 1β = , the function remains as prefer ( ) *j js uβ= , whereas if 0β = the 
function remains as n( ) ( , , )
req req
t
j jprefer s viability p π υ= B B . Either the first case does not take into 
account the received purchase requirement or its possible valuation, which means the 
selection criteria, depends solely on the local utility. The second case does not take into 
account the utility, so the product selection criteria are based solely on the estimated 
viability of the sale. Intermediate β values consider both criteria at a specific rate. 
Once the preference values for all the products in the catalogue have been calculated, by 
using a threshold filter for them, it is possible to generate a list of potential sale offers. The 
pre-set value threshold has a fundamental effect on the process of generating relax 
requirements. In general, a value below the threshold implies a high number of products in 
Sp, whereas a more selective or high threshold means that the number of products in Sp is 
smaller. If the seller agent tends to generate few products as candidates for potential sale 
offers, its behaviour can be interpreted as leaning towards leading the buyer agent towards 
a specific product. If, on the other hand, the seller agent is not very selective and the number 
of candidate products is always large, it can be assumed that it is not trying to lead the 
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negotiation towards a specific area. Therefore, this threshold is an indication of the 
impatience of the seller agent for sending constraint arguments.  
Estimate of viability nviability  
The estimate of the viability of the sale of a product must be based, in accordance with the 
characteristics of the mechanism, on: the degree of similarity between the product and the 
purchase requirement
req
πB ; and an estimation of the valuation the buyer agent will make of 
the product in question if it is offered for sale. These aspects are condensed in the following 
definition of the estimation of viability:  
 n m m( , ) ( )
req reqj bv
viability sim p Eπ υ= ◊B B  (7) 
The first term represents an estimation of the similarity between the product and the 
purchase requirement
req
πB . The second defines the estimation of the buyer agent valuation 
as an estimation function that depends on the product, and the valuation of the purchase 
requirement sent by the buyer agent (if the buyer agent's profile is expressive). The operator 
◊  has the function of considering both terms (this operator is described later). We approach 
each term separately. 
Similarity 
We can define similarity as a function of distance in the following way: 
 m n( , ) 1 ( , )
req reqj j
sim p dist pπ π= −B B  (8) 
 where n( , )
reqj
dist p πB represents the estimation of the standardized distance between a product 
and a purchase requirement
req
πB . To estimate the distance we propose using a measure 
based on Euclidean distance, making it clear that the selection is arbitrary and that it is 
possible to use other distance estimates. Our proposal is the following: 
 n n , 2
1
( , ) ( ( , ) / )
req req
n
t t i
j ji
i
dist p sqrt dist a nπ π
=
= ∑B B  (9) 
 where n ,( , )
req
t i
jidist a πB represents the distance of the attribute jia of the product to the set of 
constraints included in 
req
tπB  which refer to said attribute. This means that in the first place 
the distances between the attribute and each one of these constraints must be calculated. 
This calculation is a measure of the distance of the closest estimated limit, which limits the 
corresponding crisp constraint. However, this measure of distance between an attribute and 
the limit of a crisp constraint is an absolute measure that has to be normalized. The 
following values need to be defined: the estimated reservation value resia for each attribute; the 
farthest limit of each attribute jia , which is obtained by use of the boundary 
function ,( )
req
t iboundary πB ; the estimated relaxation speed for each attribute jia , which we 
term (0, )tiτ ∈ ∞ ; and finally, the degree of certainty of the estimated distance of an attribute jia  
which we term [0,1]tiγ ∈ . The reservation values, the relaxation velocity values and the 
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degree of certainty make up part of the seller agent's requirement model, in particular the 
set of beliefs {( , ), 1,..., }t t ti i i mδ γΔ = = , where ( , )t res ti i iaδ τ= . We now comment on each of these 
values.  
The reservation value resia expresses the seller agent's belief as to what value of relaxation 
limit the buyer agent would be willing to assume for a particular attribute. From this partial 
belief, it should not be induced that the buyer agent would be willing to relax all the 
constraints to these reserve values simultaneously. If this were the case, the seller agent 
could simply reject all the proposals until the buyer agent relaxed all its constraints. 
However, in a multiple seller agent system, using this type of strategy is conditioned by the 
seller agent's aversion to the risk of losing a sale. In our proposal, we do not specify how the 
seller agent establishes its belief about these reservation values. Beliefs could come from 
local factors, or it could be determined by external factors, for example, a record of 
negotiations with the same or other buyer agents.  
The farthest limit requires in the first place the calculation of the limits that define the crisp 
constraints that limit an attribute aji. It is assumed that these limits are the closest to the 
attribute. Once these limits are obtained, the absolute distances to the attribute can be 
calculated. The farthest limit will be the limit generated by the largest of these distances. In 
other words, the absolute distance of the attribute aji to a purchase requirement will be the 
greatest distance from said attribute to the crisp constraints that limit it. 
The estimated relaxation trend is an estimate of the buyer agent's predisposition to relax the 
constraints of a particular attribute. In this case, it is not the reserve value that is estimated, 
but the speed at which the reserve value will be reached. The idea is that the distance 
calculated for an attribute for which a rapid relaxation is estimated should be interpreted as 
shorter than for an equal distance calculated for an attribute for which a slow relaxation is 
estimated. 
The degree of certainty tiγ  is a measure of how sure the buyer agent is of the distance 
measure made for the attribute aji. 
Finally, we now present the function n ,( , )
req
t i
jidist a πB that binds all these concepts. 
 
 
distn(a
ji
,πB
req
t ,i ) =
(abs(
a
ji
− boundary(πB
req
t ,i )
a
i
res − boundary(πB
req
t ,i )
)
1/τ
i
t − 1)* γ
i
t + 1   a
ji
∈[a
i
res ,boundary(πB
req
t ,i ))
0 a
ji
∈πB
req
t ,i
1 rest
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎭
⎪⎪⎪⎪
(10)  
The distance estimate has the following properties: 
1. The distance is standardized at one in all the cases. 
2. The attribute values that exceed the estimated reservation values are fixed at distance 1. 
3. If the attribute satisfies the constraint the distance is 0. 
4. If the attribute is within the reservation value and the limit of the constraints, the 
distance is function of the remoteness of the constraints, and it is standardized by the 
distance between the reservation value and the limit of the constraints. 
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5. For an equal attribute value jia , a high value for 
t
iτ  implies a higher distance estimate 
than of a low value. Therefore, a high value for tiτ should be used when the seller agent 
does not believe that the constraints for the attribute will be relaxed largely.  
6. For 0iγ = the degree of certainty about the estimation of the distance of the attribute jia  
is nil, so the distance has value 1.  
7. For a predetermined value of 1/(.)
t
iabs τ , a low value for tiγ penalizes the distance 
estimate in comparison with a high value. 
Lastly, it is important to point out the dynamic character the parameters resia , 
t
iτ and tiγ can 
have. By this, we mean that these values can be updated even during the course of the 
negotiation because of the seller agent's beliefs, which may vary over time. For example, it is 
clear that if it is seen that the estimated reservation value is exceeded by the buyer agent's 
relaxation, the seller agent's belief with respect to the reservation value must be modified. 
Estimate of the buyer agent's valuation 
The estimate of the valuation the buyer agent will make of a sale offer is directly related to 
the explicit valuation the buyer agent may make of a purchase requirement, that's to say, 
of
req
υB . This valuation follows a similar reasoning to that which causes us to define the 
relaxation velocity tiτ and the degree of certainty tiγ . It affects the distance estimate in the 
following way: if the constraints on an attribute are of high priority, the buyer agent will be 
much less predisposed to relax them, which means the distance measure should be 
increased, so, when the buyer agent sends purchase valuations we propose the operator 
implement the following viability function: 
 n n ,, 2( )
1
1 ( ( ( , ) * ) / )t i
req
req
n
t i
ji boundary
i
viability sqrt dist a v nππ== − ∑ BB  (11) 
where ,( )t i
req
boundary
v πB represents the preference the buyer agent has that the constraint furthest 
from the attribute jia be satisfied.  
To extend the use of this viability function to those cases in which the buyer agent is non-
expressive, the seller agent considers ,( ) 1t i
req
boundary
v π =B . The prefer function finally becomes:  
 n ,, 2( )
1
( ) * (1 ) * (1 ( ( ( , ) * ) / ))t i
req
req
n
t i
j j ji boundary
i
prefer s u sqrt dist a v nπβ β π== + − − ∑ BB  (12) 
S4: Generate Relax Requirement This mechanism responds to the seller agent's need to 
generate a relax requirement
req
ρB . It conforms to the second stage of the generation of the 
relax requirement process that we described in mechanism S3. Given a set of potential sale 
offers pS , the mechanism generates a relax requirement with the aim of leading the buyer 
agent towards the products contained in pS . The mechanism returns a relax 
requirement
req
ρB . Outputs: reqρB  
The basic principle of the generation of the relax requirement is to get the buyer agent to 
relax those constraints of the purchase requirement that are not satisfied by the products 
contained in pS . We apply the following algorithm: 
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Algorithm 4. (Generate relax requirement) 
1. The relax requirement is generated as a vector
1
,...,
ik k
r r , where 0
xk
r = indicates that 
constraint 
xk
R is not satisfied by any product, and 1
xk
r = indicates that constraint 
xk
R is 
satisfied by at least one product. 
S5: Accept or Reject Offer This mechanism responds to the seller agent's need to decide at 
any given moment whether or not to accept an offer to purchase a product sent by the buyer 
agent using the locution agree_to_buy(.). There are only two possible return values, accept (pj) 
if it accepts the offer, and reject(pj) if it rejects the offer. This mechanism is easy to itemise if 
we assume a non-strategic behaviour, that is to say, if, as we have mentioned earlier, the 
agent does not keep back sale offers that satisfy the seller agents purchase requirements, 
while waiting for the buyer agent to relax its requirements further. If this supposition is 
valid, the mechanism returns accept(pj) when pj exists, and reject(pj) in the opposite case. 
Outputs: accept(pj), reject(pj) 
S6: Consider Withdrawal This mechanism responds to a seller agents need at any given 
moment to decide whether or not to terminate the dialogue with a buyer agent. The 
mechanism can remain in wait mode, and so returns wait, or indicate that it must withdraw 
from the dialogue, in which case it returns withdraw(θ) . Outputs: wait, withdraw(θ)  
Equipped with the expressive mechanisms described through locutions, and the 
corresponding internal decision mechanisms, the next stage is to link these elements to 
finally shape the complete negotiation framework. 
4.4 Operational semantics 
Operational semantics in a dialogue game indicate how the state of the dialogue changes 
after locutions have been sent. It is assumed that the agents participating in the dialogue 
have the previously described decision mechanisms implemented and that the dialogue 
states are defined by the mechanisms inputs and outputs. The locutions sent throughout the 
course of the dialogue generate transitions between the different states, so that the locutions 
sent are inputs of one or more decision mechanisms, which in turn generate new outputs in 
the form of locutions. Therefore, the operational semantics is a formalization of the 
connection between the locutions available in the dialogue model and the defined decision 
mechanisms. To express the operational semantics we define the tuple , ,xP sK that the 
decision mechanism K of agent Px describes when it generates an output s. Operational 
semantics is defined by a series of transition rules between states. When the transitions are 
between the mechanisms of different agents, they are defined by the locutions that are sent 
and when they are between the mechanisms of the same agent, they are defined without 
locutions. In the first case, an arrow and the denomination of the pertinent locution indicate 
the transition. In the second case only an arrow appears. We now present the transition rules: 
TR1 , , _ ( ) , ,.b sP have need PθB1 L1 S1JJG This transition rule indicates that a buyer agent that 
wishes to acquire a product from category θ, is trying to start a purchase negotiation 
dialogue using the locution L1: open_dialogue(.). Said locution activates the mechanism S1: 
Recognize Category of the seller agent with which it wants to establish the dialogue.  
TR2 , , _ _ ( ) , ,b bP have no need P waitθ →B1 B1 This transition rule indicates that a buyer 
agent that does not wish to acquire a product from category θ, will not start a purchase 
negotiation dialogue and will review the situation later on.  
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TR3 , , _ _ _ ( ) , ,s sP wish not to enter P waitθ →S1 S1 A seller agent that does not wish to start a 
trading dialogue with a buyer agent will review the situation later. 
TR4 , , _ _ ( ) , ,.s bP wish to enter PθS1 L2 B2JJG A seller agent that wishes to participate in a 
purchase negotiation dialogue will do so by sending the locution L2: enter_dialogue(.). This 
transmission induces the buyer agent to execute mechanism B2: Generate Purchase 
Requirement with the objective of generating the first purchase requirement. 
TR5 , , , ,.b bP P∅ →B2 B5 This transition rule affirms that when mechanism B2: Generate 
Purchase Requirement returns an empty_set in by a buyer agent it also activates mechanism B5: 
Consider Withdrawal in a buyer agent. This result is produced when a buyer agent cannot 
produce any more purchase requirements. Then it should consider withdrawing from the 
dialogue. 
TR6 , , ( ) , ,.b sP withdraw PθB5 L11 S6JJJJG When a buyer agent positively consider withdrawing 
from a dialogue, it sends the locution L11: withdraw_dialogue(). This activates in the seller 
agent mechanism S6: Consider Withdrawal so that it in turn considers withdrawing.  
TR7 , , ( ) , ,.s bP withdraw PθS6 L11 B5JJJJG When a seller considers withdrawing from the 
dialogue it sends locution L11: withdraw_dialogue(.), which in turn activates mechanism B5: 
Consider Withdrawal in the buyer agent. 
TR8 , , , ,.
reqb b
P Pπ →B2 B3B This rule indicates that when a buyer agent generates a 
purchase requirement
req
tπB , it subsequently activates internally mechanism B3: Generate 
Purchase Requirement Valuation of generate purchase requirement valuation. 
TR9 , , , ,.b sP P∅B3 L4 S2JJG Rule TR9 affirms that if mechanism B3: Generate Purchase 
Requirement Valuation induces an empty_set output, the buyer agent sends the locution L4: 
desire_to_buy(.). The locution in turn activates the seller agent's mechanism S2: Assess 
Purchase Requirement for the valuation of the purchase requirement. 
TR10 , , , ,.
reqb s
P PυB3 L6 S2JJGB This rule is identical to TR9, but the buyer agent sends the 
locution L6: prefer_to_buy(.) instead. 
TR11 , , , ,.s bP P∅S2 L8 B2JJG This transition rule describes that when mechanism S2: Assess 
Purchase Requirement returns an empty_set, the seller agent sends the locution L8: 
refuse_to_sell(.). This locution activates mechanism B2: Generate Purchase Requirement in the 
buyer agent. This rule is the definitive one that generates a rejection locution without 
arguments to a previous purchase requirement.  
TR12 , , _ ( ) , ,.s j bP sale offer p PS2 L3 B4JJG When the S2:Assess Purchase Requirement mechanism 
generates a sale offer that satisfies a purchase requirement, it is sent to the buyer agent by 
using the L3: willing_to_sell(.) locution, which in turn activates the buyer agents B4:Consider 
Offers mechanism for it to consider the offer. 
TR13 , , _ ( ) , ,.
req
t
s sP purchase requirement Pπ →S2 S3B  When the S2: Assess Purchase 
Requirement mechanism returns a purchase requirement, then the buyer agent itself activates 
the S3: Generate Potential Sale-Offer mechanism to explore the potential offers. In some way 
the S2 mechanism is indicating that the purchase requirement be used as an input procedure 
to generate arguments.  
TR14 , , , ,.s P sP S P→S3 S4 This transition rule states that the set pS of potential sale offers 
generated by the S3: Generate Potential Sale-Offer mechanism, automatically activates the S4: 
www.intechopen.com
 Multiagent Systems 
 
46 
Generate Relax Requirement mechanism of the seller agent itself to generate a relax 
requirement. 
TR15 , , , ,.
reqs b
P PρS4 L5 B2JJGB This transition rule affirms that the relax requirement 
req
ρB which is obtained when the seller agents S4: Generate Relax Requirement is executed, is 
incorporated in the L5: prefer_to_sell(.) locution sent to the buyer agent. The locution 
activates the B2: Generate Purchase Requirement in the buyer agent with the aim of getting it 
to generate a new purchase requirement using the relax requirement that it has received as a 
basis.  
TR16 , , _ _ ( ) , ,.b j bP generate purchase requirement p P→B4 B2  
The _ _ ( )jgenerate purchase requirement p output in the buyer agent's B4: Consider Offers 
mechanism activates B2: Generate Purchase Requirement. This transition appears when the 
buyer agent cannot accept a sale offer, so it needs to generate a new purchase requirement. 
TR17 , , _ ( ) , ,.b j sP accept offer p PB4 L9 S5JJG This transition rule specifies that when a sale offer 
from the B4: Consider Offers mechanism is considered, if the offer is accepted, the mechanism 
sends the L9: agree_to_buy(.) locution, which in turn activates the S5: Accept or Reject Offer 
mechanism in the seller agent. This transition describes the beginning of the confirmation 
stage of the negotiation. 
TR18 , , _ ( ) , ,.b j sP reject offer p PB4 L7 S2JJG If, after considering a sale offer from the B4: 
Consider Offers mechanism, the output of the mechanism is reject_offer( p
j
), the buyer agent 
sends the L7: refuse_to_buy(.) locution, which activates the S2: Assess Purchase Requirement 
mechanism in the seller agent. This transition reflects the buyer agents rejection of a badly 
structured sale offer. 
TR19 , , ( ) , ,.s j bP accept p PS5 L10 B5JJJJG When a seller agent considers, through the execution of 
the S5: Accept or Reject Offer mechanism, that an offer to purchase jp is valid, it sends the L10: 
agree_to_sell(.) locution, which in turn activates the B5: Consider Withdrawal mechanism in the 
buyer agent. This transition describes the definitive confirmation of a purchase. 
TR20 , , ( ) , ,.s j bP reject p PS5 L8 B2JJG If a seller agent considers that jp is an invalid offer to 
purchase, when it executes the S5: Accept or Reject Offer mechanism, it sends the L8: 
refuse_to_sell(.) locution, that automatically activates the B2: Generate Purchase Requirement 
mechanism in the buyer agent. This result is produced when the confirmation stage cannot 
be completed due to the disappearance of the product jp from the seller agent’s catalogue.  
TR21 , , , ,.x xP wait P→K K When any mechanism K returns wait as an output, it indicates 
that the agent intention is to execute the same mechanism later. 
One of the fundamental aims of our work is to develop an automated negotiation system. 
Therefore, the first thing we must demonstrate is that the dialogue model, the decision 
mechanism, and the operational semantics, that is to say our dialogue game framework for 
automated purchase negotiation is able to generate dialogue automatically. To demonstrate 
that the negotiation is automated we need to demonstrate: (a) that all the locutions can be 
activated by one or more of the decision mechanisms, and (b) that every time one of these 
mechanisms is executed it ultimately activates a locution. To support these propositions we 
first present for (a), a list of the locutions, together with the mechanisms that activate them, 
and the transition rule in which the activation is featured. 
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L1: Mechanism B1 (Rule TR1). 
L2: Mechanism S1 (Rule TR4). 
L3: Mechanism S2 (Rule TR12). 
L4: Mechanism B3 (Rule TR9). 
L5: Mechanism S4 (Rule TR15). 
L6: Mechanism B3 (Rule TR10). 
L7: Mechanism B4 (Rule TR18). 
L8: Mechanism S2 (Rule TR11); Mechanism S5 (Rule TR20). 
L9: Mechanism B4 (Rule TR17). 
L10: Mechanism S5 (Rule TR19). 
L11: Mechanism B5 (Rule TR6); Mechanism S6 (Rule TR7). 
 
For (b), we show for each mechanism and their possible states: whether they activate a 
locution, or whether they indirectly activate a mechanism that in turn activates a locution. 
We also present the transition rules where these connections are established. 
 
B1: Output have_need activates L1 (Rule TR1). 
B1: Output have_no_need activates the mechanism B1 (Rule TR2). 
B2: Output empty_set activates the mechanism B5 (Rule TR5). 
B2: Output 
req
πB activates the mechanism B3 (Rule TR8). 
B3: Output empty_set activates the locution L4 (Rule TR9) 
B3: Output 
req
υB activates the locution L6 (Rule TR10). 
B4: Output generate_purchase_requirement invokes the mechanism B2 (Rule TR16). 
B4: Output accept_offer invokes the locution L9 (Rule TR17). 
B4: Output reject_offer invokes L7 (Rule TR18). 
B5: Output withdraw_dialogue invokes L11 (Rule TR6). 
S1: Output wish_not_to_enter activates the mechanism S1 (Rule TR3). 
S1: Output wish_to_enter activates the locution L2 (Rule TR4). 
S2: Output emtpy_set invokes L8 (Rule TR11). 
S2: Output sale_offer invokes L3 (Rule TR12). 
S2: Output purchase_requirement invokes the mechanism S3 (Rule TR13). 
S3: Output pS activates the mechanism S4 (Rule TR14). 
S4: Output
req
ρB invokes the locution L5 (Rule TR15). 
S5: Output accept invokes L10 (Rule TR19). 
S5: Output reject invokes L8 (Rule TR20). 
S6: Output withdraw invokes the locution L11 (Rule TR7). 
 
We can easily prove that all the mechanisms generate a locution or activate a mechanism 
that then generates a locution, or activate a mechanism that then generates another 
mechanism that finally generates a locution.  
5. Experimental analysis 
Our negotiation framework allows us to test with different expressive and receptive 
strategies. An expressive buyer agent ( 1ξ = ) makes use of purchase valuations, whilst a non-
expressive one ( 0ξ = ) does not. The receptiveness is determined by η , which has a 
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continuous domain that we limit to non-receptive ( 0η = ) and receptive ( 1η = ). On the other 
hand, an expressive seller agent ( 1ψ = ) makes use of relax requirements, whilst a non-
expressive one ( 0ψ = ) does not. The receptive profile determined by β has a continuous 
domain that we limit to 0, 0.5 and 1 (value 0 indicates no receptivity, 0.5 intermediate, and 1 
maximum). However, not all the combinations of strategies are valid. 
5.1 Analysis of validity of Individual strategies 
We look first at agent level and we begin with the buyer agent: 
(BAer) expressive and receptive, (BAner) non-expressive and receptive, and (BAnenr) 
non-expressive and non-receptive are valid strategies. However, (BAenr) expressive and 
non-receptive strategies make no sense as the purpose of the valuation is to redirect the 
negotiation in such a way that the seller agent sends useful relax requirements. If the agent 
does not analyse relax requirements, the valuation is of no use whatsoever. To sum up, the 
buyer agent can behave in three different ways: BAer, BAner y BAnenr. 
We now analyse the seller agent: 
(SAer1) expressive and receptive ( 0β = ), (SAer0.5) expressive and receptive ( 0.5β = ), 
(SAenr) expressive and non-receptive ( 1β = ), and (SAnenr) non-expressive and non-
receptive are valid strategies. However, (SAner1 or SAner0.5) non-expressive and any 
receptive strategy makes no sense as a non-expressive seller agent does not send relax 
requirements, and the main purpose of a receptive strategy is to direct the relax 
requirements. To sum up, the seller agent can behave in accordance with four different 
strategies: SAer1, SAer0.5, SAenr and SAnenr. 
5.2 Analysis of validity of combination of strategies 
There are 12 possible combinations of strategies. However, some of these combinations are 
not coherent. In BAer vs SAnenr the buyer agent's valuations are not taken into account by 
the seller agent, which furthermore is not expressive. This aspect is detectable by the buyer 
agent, given that it does not receive relaxation requirements. A rational agent will not send 
valuations if it knows they are of no use. This combination is not stable and therefore 
equilibrium is not possible. The best strategy for a buyer agent under these circumstances is 
to change to a non-expressive and non-receptive strategy BAnenr. In BAner vs SAnenr 
neither of the agents is expressive, so for the buyer agent to be receptive makes no sense, 
and furthermore this fact it detectable by the buyer agent. A rational buyer agent would 
change to a BAnenr strategy. After this analysis, there are 10 pairs of balanced strategies : 
BAer vs SAer1, BAer vs SAer0.5, BAer vs SAenr, BAner vs SAer1, BAner vs SAer0.5, 
BAner vs SAenr, BAnenr vs SAer1, BAnenr vs SAer0.5, BAnenr vs SAenr, y BAnenr vs 
SAnenr. To simplify this repertoire we have made the following groupings: 
BAer vs SAexrx This group has in common the fact that the buyer agent is simultaneously 
expressive and receptive, and the seller agent is expressive. Furthermore it seems obvious 
that the seller agents' different receptive profiles will affect the results of the negotiation, 
because the generation of relax requirements varies depending on this profile. Therefore, a 
priori we need to test with the three combinations that make up the group.  
BAner vs SAexrx This group of strategies has in common the fact that the buyer agent is not 
expressive, but it is receptive and the seller agent is expressive. When the seller agent is 
receptive, intuitively we can affirm that the results of the negotiations are different to those 
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of the previous group. This is so because the buyer agent's valuations are not available to the 
seller agent. However, when the seller agent is not receptive the scenario is identical to the 
previous group. In other words, if the seller agent is not receptive it makes no difference 
whether the buyer agent sends valuations or not. In conclusion, the BAner vs SAenr pair is 
identical to BAer vs SAenr, as far as the results of the negotiation are concerned. To speed 
up the tests of this type, we have opted to define the test as BAner vs SAenr. 
BAnenr vs SAxexrx This group of strategies is characterised by the non-expressivity and 
non-receptivity of the buyer agent. Therefore, it makes no difference whether the seller 
agent is expressive or receptive or not as the buyer agent will be unable to consider it. To 
speed up the execution of the tests in this group, we have opted to define as representative 
the BAnenr vs SAnenr pair. 
Summarizing, there exist six pairs of representative strategies. 
5.3 Buyer's preferences and seller's catalogue of products 
The buyer agent's preferences are described as a 5 fuzzy constraint problem 1...5
fR over 5 
attributes 1...5a . Given a catalogue of products S, the set of products that may be a solution to 
a negotiation is the solution set solS S⊆ . This set is comprised of the products that maximize 
the buyer agent's utility. This occurs when the seller agent is non-strategic with regards to 
the occultation of products and the buyer agent relaxes constraints minimizing the lost of 
posd. Finally, the noise set noiseS S⊆ , is the set of complementary products to solS , so 
that sol noiseS S S∪ = . In the experiments, the set solS is defined as a set of products where 
( ) 0.7ipα = for the buyer agent, while the utilities for the set noiseS are 0.1, 0.2 or 0.3. Once the 
products from the solution and noise sets have been generated, the next step is to assign 
utility values ju to each of them. In the case of noiseS these are generated randomly using a 
uniform allocation between 0.9 and 1, while for solS a uniform allocation between 0 and 0.69 
is used. To test the pareto-efficiency of the negotiations, also randomly, the utility of one of 
the products from the set solS is assigned 0.7. The aim is to see if this solution is reached after 
a negotiation. With this allocation of utilities, the seller agent's preferred sale offers are the 
noise set products. However, an intelligent seller agent would conclude that these products 
are not a valid sale offer and it would try to obtain the best solution from amongst those 
products that can really be a solution, in other words, from the solution set. 
5.4 Test results 
For each of the six pairs of strategies that we analyze and the different sizes of catalogues, 
300 negotiations are carried out. We take as a reference the number of products from the 
solution set, so that the noise set is the same size as the solution set in every case. Taking 
into account that the buyer agent's overall satisfaction degree is known, the result we need 
to analyse is the utility the seller agent obtains from each negotiation. The results show the 
median and the success rate, where the success rate estimates the number of times that the 
pareto-optimal solution is obtained, that is to say, the solution in which 0.7ju = . In every 
case, the calculated confidence interval is 95%. The summary of results is shown in Table 1. 
It can be seen that with the BAnenr vs SAnenr strategies the success rate stabilizes around 
10%, although for 4 and 8 products the rate is higher, which is logical, as the number of relax 
combinations is greater than the number of products. There is a dip in the median value 
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with 16 products. However, the median grows again as the number of products increases. 
This effect was foreseeable, as when the number of products is augmented, the probability 
that the seller agent has products with a high utility for the purchase requirement is greater. 
The results for the BAer/BAner vs SAer1 strategies are similar to the BAnenr vs SAnenr 
strategies. This result was foreseeable, taking into account that the seller agent is not a 
utility maximizer. In the BAer vs SAer0.5 strategies the valuation of the purchase 
requirements distracts the seller agent, so it unfavourably modifies the preferences of the 
different sale offers and ends up concentrating the search in the noise set, and the results 
are similar to the BAnenr vs SAnenr strategies. The BAner vs SAenr strategies are also 
similar to those obtained with the BAnenr vs SAnenr strategies. These results are very 
important, because they allow us to appreciate how, when a seller agent limits to looking 
out for its best interest and only thinks about the utility, the results are not good. Finally, 
with the BAner vs SAer0.5 strategies we can check how the results are significantly better 
in every case. This test shows that the expressivity of the seller agent is key to obtaining 
satisfactory solutions. 
 
BAnenr vs SAnenr, BAer/BAner vs SAer1,BAner vs SAenr, BAer vs SAer0.5 
Number of products Success rate Confidence interv. Median 
4 0.4400 0.3830 0.4982 0.6432 
8 0.32 0.2676 0.3760 0.5502 
16 0.15 0.1116 0.1955 0.4867 
32 0.12 0.0855 0.1622 0.5362 
64 0.15 0.1116 0.1955 0.6326 
128 0.11 0.0769 0.1510 0.6419 
256 0.07 0.0439 0.1050 0.6686 
BAner vs SAer05 
4 0.9500 0.9189 0.9717 0.7 
8 0.7600 0.7076 0.8072 0.7 
16 0.6900 0.6343 0.7419 0.7 
32 0.5200 0.4618 0.5778 0.7 
64 0.4500 0.3928 0.5082 0.6859 
128 0.3600 0.3056 0.4172 0.6647 
256 0.3300 0.2770 0.3864 0.6807 
Table 1. Summary of results 
In Figure 5 the results obtained from the tests of the BAnenr vs SAnenr, and BAner vs SAer05 
strategies are summarised. In the top graphic the medians are shown, and in the bottom one 
the success rates. The success rates follow the same trend for all the catalogues, with a 
noticeable improvement in the case of the BAner vs SAer05 strategies. As regards the 
medians, for catalogues with up to 64 products, the results are optimum. For catalogues 
with more than 256 products the strategies tend to converge, so expressivity is not a 
determinant factor. It should be recalled that a heavily populated catalogue means the seller 
agent will have high utility sale offers with a higher probability. 
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Fig. 5. Comparative of the Banenr vs Sanenr and the Baner vs Saer05 strategies 
Finally, in Figure 6 two graphs are presented that depict the percentage improvement in the 
success rates and the comparative percentage improvement in utility. The improvement in 
the success rates portrays the comparative between the percentage of success rates obtained 
with the BAner vs SAer05 strategies and those obtained with the BAnenr vs Sanenr strategies. 
This graph presents a very important property, which is the exponential trend of 
comparative improvements in the success rates. For catalogues with a small solution set the 
improvement is of approximately 200%, with an increase of around 325% for medium sized 
catalogues of 16 and 32 products being observed. It should be taken into account that when 
there are very few products, the possibility of a good solution being found at random, is 
greater than when the catalogue is large, which is why the improvement is smaller for 4 and 
8 products. Although for 64 products the success rate decreases to 250%, in general, as the 
size of the catalogues increases there is an exponential tendency for the rates to improve. As 
the catalogues become very large, the probability of obtaining an optimal solution without 
expressivity decreases exponentially down to zero, whereas with expressivity the optimal 
solution is explicitly searched.  
The relative improvement in utility is a comparative measure that compares the 
improvements obtained with the BAner vs SAer05 strategies with respect the maximum 
improvement obtained. It can be observed that the reference catalogue is the one with 16 
products, which is the scenario with which the maximum utility is obtained. Therefore, the 
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graph shows a percentage of relative improvement of 100% for this catalogue. For large 
catalogues, the percentage of relative improvement decreases to below 10%. The minimum 
percentage improvement for smaller catalogues is 10% with an average value of around 
60%. 
 
Fig. 6. Improvement in the success rate and relative improvement of utility 
6. Conclusions and future work 
This chapter presents a fuzzy constraint based model for automated purchase negotiations 
in competitive trading environments. The analysis of the model shows that the expressivity 
of the seller agent is essential to obtain an improvement in the negotiations. However, the 
expressivity of the buyer agent makes the results come close to those achieved with the 
reference non-expressive and non-receptive strategies. The viability of the potential sale 
offers is decisive in the improvement of the negotiations, and so, the BAner vs SAenr 
strategies, which focus on the seller agents' utility, are invalid. To sum up, we can affirm 
that the expressivity factor brings significant benefit to the negotiation process and the key 
element resides in the expressivity of the seller agent and the receptivity of the buyer agent. 
However, it must be pointed out that under our negotiation model, an 'inexpressive' buyer 
agent is more expressive than an 'inexpressive' seller agent because a buyer agent expresses 
offers as a set of constraints, while a seller agent expresses offers as concrete products or 
rejections to purchase requirements. 
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As future work, we propose the refinement of the mechanisms related to the purchase 
requirement valuation. As we have seen, the results using valuations of purchase 
requirements are not good because valuations distract the seller agent. We suggest to test 
different estimates for the viability parameter in the prefer function of the generate potential 
sale offers seller's mechanism. We believe that including valuations in the purchase 
requirements the negotiation processes may be improved. 
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